Tomorrow is the deadline for state attorneys general to sign on to a joint federal and multi-state $25 billion settlement of the robo-mortgage scandal. The settlement will involve Ally Financial Inc. (formerly GMAC), Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and Wells Fargo & Co. The details of the proposed settlement have not been released. However, one thing is clear: This settlement puts the nation at further risk of another systematic financial crisis and runs counter to any notion that the actions of the Obama administration will reflect the president’s newly energized populist rhetoric.
As a nation, we need to ask several questions. As a participatory democracy, we also have the right to the answers before any settlement is inked:
1. In his State of the Union Address, President Obama announced a new financial crimes taskforce, yet the administration is rushing to finalize this settlement before the taskforce begins its work. Why?
2. What is the public interest in releasing banks that have openly admitted they broke the law by signing false affidavits in tens of thousands of separate instances from liability?
3. The bank narrative has been that the robo-mortgage scandal reflected technical issues which harmed no one. Recently, new allegations have emerged that suggest these activities were actually the back-end of even greater malfeasance involving tax evasion, the failure to comply with basic rules in securitizing mortgages, and an attempt to avoid high liabilities on the part of the banks to the purchasers of the mortgage bonds.
These allegations operate as follows. First, as Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism explains, it appears the specific mortgages which were the assets comprising the securitized bonds were never actually transferred to the bonds, within the required time period (90 days under New York law).
By way of background: remember that the big concern about the release was that it would go beyond robosigning and waive other types of liability. The ones observers were most concerned about were what we called chain of title issues, namely that the parties that had put mortgage securitizations together had failed on a widespread basis to take the steps stipulated in their own contracts to transfer the notes (and in lien theory states, to assign the lien) properly.
The securitization agreements were rigid, requiring that the transfers through multiple parties be completed by a date certain, typically 90 days after the closing of the trust. Most deals elected New York law as the governing law for the trusts, and New York law allows them to operate only as stipulated. Since the notes were supposed to be transferred in by a particular date, trying to move them in later is a "void act" having no legal effect. That makes attempts to make transfers legally at this juncture a non-starter.
Having realized somewhat late in the game that their failure to do what they promised could interfere with trusts' ability to foreclose and create tons of liability, servicers and their various agents have relied on not just robosiging, but widespread document fabrication and forgeries to fix their transfer problem when judges have taken notice. Anyone who has been on this beat knows of numerous cases where foreclosure documents are challenged, say for being too late, not having the right transfers, etc, that new versions of supposedly original documents that tell the right story miraculously show up in court.
Second, Ellen Brown, the President of The Public Banking Institute, explains the implications of this failure to abide by the 90 day deadline:
Since 1986, mortgage-backed securities have been issued to investors through SPVs [Special Purpose Vehicles] called REMICs (Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits). REMICs are designed as tax shelters; but to qualify for that status, they must be "static." Mortgages can't be transferred in and out once the closing date has occurred. The REMIC Pooling and Servicing Agreement typically states that any transfer significantly after the closing date is invalid. Yet the newly robo-signed documents, which are required to begin foreclosure proceedings, are almost always executed long after the trust's closing date.
Third, as Brown also notes, the liabilities associated with a failure to transfer the documents on time came to head when:
Fannie Mae sent out a memo telling servicers that in order to be reimbursed under HAMP--a government loan modification program designed to help at-risk homeowners meet their mortgage payments--the servicers would have to produce the paperwork showing the loan had been assigned to the trust.
Brown believes that, as a result,
The hasty solution was a rash of assignments signed by an army of "robosigners," to be filed in the public records
This explains why, as noted by Brown above, "the newly filed robo-signed documents" are "almost always executed long after the trusts closing date."
All of this is undoubtedly highly complex. And, I am not in a position to investigate whether it is true. However, the implications of these assertions are grave. If the mortgages were knowingly assigned to the REMICS after the closing date, then the tax benefits of the REMICS appear to be invalid. If so, these transfers appear to represent tax evasion by the banks. As part of an ongoing scheme, they also constitute, in all likelihood, conspiracy and fraud on the bond purchasers.
With regard to the bond purchasers, as Yves Smith notes above, the failure to adequately establish the trusts created "tons of liability" for the banks to these purchasers; since the banks then effectively misrepresented the nature of the bonds they were selling.
At the moment, the important question here is not whether these allegations are true. What's important is that their appears to be enough evidence to warrant at least a minimal investigation of these astounding assertions--which suggests that a large part of the robo-mortgage scandal was the back-end of potentially serious criminal activities and an attempt to evade enormous liabilities.
In all likelihood, tomorrow's settlement means these serious questions will never be answered.
If we are a nation where justice is blind, should we not investigate the full truth before we give the offending financial institutions another free pass?
4. Why are the terms of this settlement secret? Prosecutorial negotiations are normally secret in order to prevent the disclosure of evidence that might or might not be relevant to a later trial if the negotiations collapse. This concern does not apply here.
5. This settlement has far more of the characteristics of legislation than of prosecutorial activities. The offending banks have destroyed the wealth, livelihood, and dreams of millions of Americans. Shouldn’t the public at least have two weeks to view the proposed terms of the settlement and make their views known to their state’s attorney general? And at a time when trust in government is at historic lows, isn’t secrecy for this type of activity the wrong way to build the much-needed confidence of the American people?
6. The press also has a constitutionally guaranteed role in our system of governance. In these unusual circumstances, isn’t this precisely the type of situation where the nation would benefit from careful scrutiny of the intended settlement by the press?
7. Officials have indicated that the settlement will require banks to write down the principal on homeowner loans. Unfortunately, a portion of the $25 billion allocated for this purpose is far too little, spread across a large number of homeowners, for any write-downs to make an effective difference. So either these statements are effectively meaningless, or the settlement is based on promises of future activities by banks. To date, the nation has witnessed repeated and egregiousfailures by the banks to live up to promises of future behavior, with no subsequent penalties for such failures. For any release from liabilities to be effective, shouldn’t it be contingent on the banks actually delivering on these promises?
Since the start of the economic crisis, none of the administration’s housing policies have succeeded. Each policy initiative has been fatally flawed. As a consequence, there’s no reason to believe that the policy pursued in the current settlement will aid, rather than hurt, the housing market. Meanwhile, the secrecy surrounding this policy initiative makes its potential positive contribution to the crisis even more suspect.
A month ago, I wrote that we were a nation in denial with regard to housing prices and the impact of ongoing foreclosures. Despite a favorable rent to buy ratio, ultra-low interest rates and an “all time low cost of owning a home,” housing prices are continuing downward. There is a simple explanation. With foreclosures and the so-called shadow inventory of homes, our housing supply will overshadow demand for many years to come.
With 29 percent of homeowners already underwater, this creates a massive risk for the economy. Some analysts predict that home prices will drop another 10 to 20 percent, which will put many borrowers deeply underwater. With additional price declines, underwater homeowners may start to simply walk away in droves. This will create havoc for our economy, the mortgage securities markets, and it will destroy solvency of the banks as they are forced to write-down their portfolios. The nation will be plunged into another economic crisis.
Unfortunately, all indications over the past several weeks are that this risk is continuing to grow. Indeed, the most recent reports on housing prices showed larger than expected declines in November. This reflected the third month in a row of declines. “The trend is down and there are few, if any, signs in the numbers that a turning point is close at hand,” said David M. Blitzer, chairman of the S&P’s home price index committee.
In his State of the Union speech, President Obama stressed assistance for “responsible homeowners.” Yet the current definition of a responsible homeowner is someone with a job. (Although yesterday the president did say, “We’re working to make sure people don’t lose their homes just because they lost their job.” ) So, at least for the moment, continued unemployment woes will keep this vicious cycle going.
Here’s how this relates to the proposed settlement: All of the activities covered by the settlement took place after the crisis began. They were not unforeseen effects of once-in-a-lifetime systematic risk. They reflected willful and knowing disrespect for the rule of law. To date, documents provided by the banks to the Courts, as well as accompanying testimony, demonstrate that laws were broken on a massive scale. The essence of capitalism is responsibility and accountability. The settlement ignores both. (See the letter below from a Michigan County official asking the Michigan Attorney General to "refuse" to join the settlement)
In 2010, Richard Cordray, then Ohio Attorney General, sued GMAC seeking a $25,000 fine for each false affidavit filed. Now, the open question is what is the potential liability of the banks, absent a settlement, for the robo-mortgage activities. The banks desire to settle at $25 billion is one indicator that their actual liability is probably far higher. My suspicion is that the total liability, including all punitive damages for criminal and civil malfeasance, would be sufficient to make the banks insolvent. This means that, because of the banks’ malfeasance and greed, the nation has the leverage to bargain for a massive write-down of mortgages — thereby preventing an economic catastrophe. I am not advocating this option, nor am I saying it is good policy. But I do believe it would be a scandal to limit whatever leverage we have to save our economy by once again permitting gross malfeasance.